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U.S. Liberals in a Realist World: Suggestions from 1776-1967 for the Extrovert 
Phase of the Coming Half Century Introvert/Extrovert Mood Cycle  
Shubham Sapkota and Dr. Jack Holmes  
Hope College, Holland Michigan 
Abstract  
United States Foreign Policy Moods, researched by Klingberg (1952) and 
Holmes (1985 and 2011), speculate the likely return to American introversion 
in the next few years after almost three decades of extroversion. 
  
Through the analysis of American business liberal and reform liberal thinking 
during the extrovert phases from 1798-1967, this research will present realist 
suggestions for the long-term. While each phase of introversion or 
extroversion is unique, past patterns remain relevant. After upcoming 
introversion has run its course, transition to extroversion is likely as it 
happened in 1940 and 1989. 
  
At the present time the U.S. is involved in various regions of the world as a 
dominant power and transitioning to introversion could restrict U.S. options. 
The rising power of other nations and uncertain skills of future presidents 
could make it difficult to return to a dominant position in the extrovert phase 
of the cycle starting a few decades later.  
 
To date, the authors have evidence that breaking the introvert/extrovert cycle 
would be the best. Without making policy changes, the U.S. will not be able to 
promote optimum long-term national interests. In order to gain support for 
consistency with the changing world order, the U.S. has to increasingly put 
effort into dealing with both domestic as well as international issues. This 
paper brings attention to how U.S. needs to deal with the changing dynamics 
of political and military strength. Focused attention on issues of economy, 
security, and environment is needed during a time of increasing globalism 
challenged by asymmetric forces. At the same time threats facing the U.S. 
need to be contained.  If that is not possible, the past can help identify ways to 
manage future choices. The long-term analysis in this paper is a valuable 
supplement to short-term analysis.  
The Importance of the Mood Interest Theory  
 
Objectives 
• To identify measures and policies that can be done during 
introvert phases to avoid policy extremes during introvert and 
extrovert phases.  
Limitations 
• Our research is qualitative and it is difficult to put events in 
general and recent events in particular into long term 
perspective. Furthermore we experienced difficulty finding 
quantitative measures over a 200 year period for events other 
then wars. 
Conclusions 
• Liberal Idealism as reflected in mood is likely to win out over 
conservative realism as reflected in interests.  
• Absent any special circumstances, this pattern is likely to 
continue. 
• The biggest problem involved is that, with the possible exception 
of China, there arguably are no viable candidates to assume the 
U.S. role in the world in the next half century. 
• Challenges to the existing order involved the last dominant 
world power, the UK, in two world wars. 
• A possibility of peaceful resolution exists in so far as the existing 
order has many elements of a liberal order, in part due to U.S. 
power. 
• If an optimum solution is not feasible, perhaps the U.S. can 
resort to damage limitation by at least considering long term 
aspects of short term changes.  
Implications 
• Frequently during introvert phases the US misses emerging 
international trends. This research indicates that both long term 
and short term analysis is necessary.  
METHODS 
• To use a traditional source, Tomas Baily’s Diplomatic History of 
the United States (Tenth Edition 1980) as well as Herring’s more 
contemporary (2011) From Colony to Superpower: US Foreign 
Relations since 1776 (Oxford Edition) to Qualitatively examine 
these events.  
On the United States’ Response to the International 
Arena 
  
THE FOREIGN POLICY MOOD CYCLE, 1776–
PRESENT 
 
1776–97: First Introvert period (Revolution, 
establishment of government) 
 
1798–1823: First Extrovert period (undeclared 
French naval war, Louisiana Purchase, War of 1812) 
 
1824–44: Second Introvert period (Nullification 
Crisis, Texas question) 
 
1845–70: Second Extrovert period (Texas and 
Oregon annexations, Mexican War, Civil War) 
 
1871–90: Third Introvert period (Internal Growth, 
External Caution) 
 
1891–1918: Third Extrovert period (Spanish-
American War, World War I) 
 
1919–39: Fourth Introvert period (League of 
Nations rejection, Neutrality Acts) 
 
1940–67: Fourth Extrovert period (World War II, 
Cold War, Korean, and Vietnam Wars) 
 
1968–88: Fifth Introvert period (Vietnamization, 
détente, weakening of Soviet Union) 
 
1989–present: Fifth Extrovert period (Post–Cold 
War assertion, Gulf War, War on Terror) 
 
 
 
As a Liberal Power on the international Arena, The United States 
often experiences difficulty responding to the realist nature of 
politics within the international arena. Because of this difficulty the 
United States tends to, as history shows, miss emerging 
international political trends and in many cases; if the United States 
is in a period of introversion, it can miss out on key chances to 
pursue its interests in the international arena.  This research aims to 
help illustrate ways in which the US can moderate its extremes of 
introversion and extroversion and therefore become a more 
effective participant in the international arena.  
 
U.S. Interests from Mood/Interest Theory 
 
• Freedom of Seas 
• Territorial Integrity 
• Dominant Outside Power in Latin America 
• Prevent One Nation Dominance of Europe 
• Prevent One Nation dominance of East Asia 
• Access to and Promoting Peace in Rest of the World 
It would seem widely agreed upon that there are patterns in 
history in which are repeated. Empires expand, buckle under 
their own weight and fall, learning fuels expansion and 
inequality fuels unrest. These patters exist as well in the 
discipline of Political Science. In the field of electoral politics, 
we define candidates for office often by describing them with 
the names of other politicians, he’s a Reagan we might say or 
he’s a Clinton; the field of political science often relies heavily 
on the past to categorize the future. With His Mood Interest 
Theory, Dr. Jack Homes provided a method of categorizing 
foreign policy moods from a historical context. Since 
knowledge of the definition as well as a brief overview of past 
American Foreign Policy moods is essential to the 
comprehension of our research, we have included a brief 
overview American Foreign Policy moods going back to the 
founding elsewhere on this poster. The Mood/Interest Theory 
divides United States’ foreign policy mood into periods of 
introversion and extroversion.  
 
Conclusions   
 
Each extrovert phase averaging 27 years started with a need for the U.S. to make up for inaction during the 
preceding introvert phase.  In the middle of each extrovert phase, the U.S. policy was generally in accord with 
interests as defined by the realities of international relations.  By the end of each extrovert phase, U.S. policy 
overreached to the point that the U.S. was doing too much.  The cause of the problem was that liberal idealism as 
reflected in mood won out over conservative realism as reflected in interests. 
  
Absent any special circumstances, this pattern is likely to continue.  To get to an introvert extreme of inaction, the 
U.S. must first pass through the first two-thirds of an introvert phase averaging 21 years which could start at any 
time.  It might have already started with the second Obama administration in 2014 which would only be two years 
earlier than average. The difficulty that the Obama administration has experienced in executing change is not unlike 
the difficulties facing other early introvert administrations as they worked to reduce the U.S. politico-military role in 
the world.  It is entirely feasible that the second stage of this introvert phase will see U.S. policies align with 
interests and that a third stage will move will feature some dangerous inaction. 
  
The biggest problem involved is that, with the possible exception of China, there arguably are no viable candidates 
to assume the U.S. role in the world in the next half century.   Rather a lot of powers will be in a position to improve 
their positions, but not to become a power with the ability to maintain world order.  That order might be maintained 
by fortunate circumstances.  However, it might also degenerate into a free for all featuring a lot of challengers to the 
existing order to include some that do not control a nation state.  
  
These challenges to the existing order involved the last dominant world power, the United Kingdom, in two world 
wars prior to the U.S. becoming the dominant world power. The wisest U.S. policy under these circumstances would 
be to revert to realism and start by determining what is important to U.S. interests and what is not important.  That 
would require a curtailment of liberal moods in favor more of a realist dedication to world order.  The prospects for 
this do not seem likely for a country of business liberals and reform liberals addicted to short term solutions. A 
possibility of peaceful resolution exists in so far as the existing order has many elements of a liberal order, in part 
due to U.S. power.  
  
If an optimum solution is not feasible, perhaps the U.S. can resort to damage limitation by at least considering long 
term aspects of short term changes. The implications of international policy changes take a long time to become 
apparent.  Formation of a think tank to consolidate studies of long term trends in a realist manner might be a good 
use of private research funds. Perhaps it could be the U.S. Interests Institute.   
  
One hope for the best solution would be that the Mood/Interest Theory is accepted by a significant number of 
analysts. Under these circumstances, the public could well revolt and decide that it does not want to be predictable.  
That could be a major help. 
  
In recent years, a realist analysis by John Mearsheimer (2014), a series of lectures on presidential leadership by 
Joseph Nye (2013), a study of conservative internationalism Henry Nye (2013), and book warning of retrenchment 
problems by Bret Stevens (2014) indicate that the U.S. policy has a lot of choices to be made. This is just a notation 
of some books that point to future choices. Collectively recent studies point to the lack of consensus one might 
inspect during a time of mood change. In addition, asymmetrical separatist forces are alive and well in some regions 
of the world.  
  
